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LAW FOR “ALIENS AND STRANGERS”:
EXAMINING THE FOREIGN COMMERCE
CLAUSE THROUGH THE LENS OF
INDIAN COMMERCE CLAUSE LAW
Laura Choi1
I. INTRODUCTION2
IN 2004, Larry Bollinger, a Lutheran minister, moved from his homein North Carolina to a community outside Port-au-Prince, Haiti,where he had been hired to oversee a religious ministry known as the
Lazarus Project.3 The Project included a school and a health center that
served local communities and was funded by non-Haitian donors who
“believe[d] the value of education, the impact of primary health care and
the power of spiritual growth will result in the empowerment of Hai-
tians.”4 Unbeknownst to his new employers, Bollinger was a sex addict.5
Once in Haiti, Bollinger progressed to molesting children he met through
his job.6 In 2009, Bollinger sought counseling in the United States, where
he confessed to his crimes abroad.7 During the session, Bollinger’s coun-
selor noted that the minister was not “overly concerned” about disclosing
his indiscretions in Haiti, but was unwavering in his insistence that he
never harmed a child in the United States, leading the counselor to be-
lieve that “perhaps [Bollinger] thought he was beyond the reach of the
law because . . . his behavior had taken place in another country.”8
As Bollinger eventually learned, however, his abuse of children in Ha-
iti violated a controversial provision of the Prosecutorial Remedies and
1. SMU Dedman School of Law, J.D. expected 2017. Thank you to Professor Co-
langelo for his suggestions and to Brennwyn Romano for her invaluable research assis-
tance. All mistakes are my own. Deepest thanks to Max, for everything.
2. Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ca, 109 U.S. 556, 571 (1883) (arguing that tribal sovereignty
should not be trampled by intrusions of U.S. law into internal tribal affairs “where, against
an express exception in the law itself, that law . . . is sought to be extended over aliens and
strangers . . . from the authority and power which seeks to impose upon them the restraints
of an external and unknown code. . .which judges them by a standard made by others, and
not for them, which takes no account of the conditions which should except them from its
exactions . . .”).
3. United States v. Bollinger, 798 F.3d 201, 203 (4th Cir. 2015).
4. Mission Statement, LAZARUS PROJECT VILLAGE OF HOPE, http://village-
ofhopehaiti.org/ [https://perma.cc/BV6Q-NKG8].
5. Bollinger, 798 F.3d at 203.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 204.
8. Id.
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Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act (hereinafter
PROTECT Act), which criminalizes sexual exploitation of children by
Americans abroad.9 Within the past ten years, serious debate has arisen
as to whether Congress had the power to pass this law under the Foreign
Commerce Clause, which gives Congress the power “[t]o regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations . . . .”10 Although many cases have inquired
into the meaning of the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, little case
law exists on what Professor Anthony Colangelo calls the “outward-look-
ing foreign commerce power,” which allows Congress to regulate extra-
territorially.11 The validity of the PROTECT Act hinges on the type of
activity that qualifies as “commerce”—and so can properly be regu-
lated—under the outward-looking Foreign Commerce Clause.12 United
States v. Bollinger is only one of the most recent cases in a profusion of
legal and academic interest in the definition of commerce under the out-
ward-looking Foreign Commerce Clause.13
Oddly, none of the commentators or judges to explore this subject have
looked to Indian Commerce Clause law as an interpretive aid. If they
had, they would have discovered a cast of characters Larry Bollinger
might recognize: well-intentioned missionaries,14 desperate children,15
unscrupulous traders eager to help Native Americans acquire a taste for
alcohol,16 and perpetrators of cross-racial and cross-national crimes of the
most dastardly kind.17
This Article argues that similarities like these make Indian Commerce
Clause law an important resource in the search for the meaning of com-
merce under the Foreign Commerce Clause. Specifically, pre-1885 Indian
Commerce Clause law suggests that foreign “commerce” is a broad con-
cept that includes commercial and diplomatic relations between sover-
eign nations and activity that demonstrably affects willingness or ability
of foreign countries or individuals to engage in commercial or diplomatic
activities with the United States. Moreover, this power is limited by the
sovereignty of other nations and—to a lesser extent—by an independent
obligation to protect the welfare of foreign nationals.
This Article will begin by briefly exploring the history of the outward-
looking Foreign Commerce Clause, focusing especially on the reasons
why it has remained largely unexplored as a source of federal power. The
9. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2423 (West 2016).
10. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; see, e.g., United States v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 308
(3d Cir. 2011).
11. Anthony J. Colangelo, The Foreign Commerce Clause, 96 VA. L. REV. 949, 969
(2010).
12. See Alaina Caliendo, What Happens Abroad Does Not Stay Abroad: United States
v. Pendleton and Congress’s Constitutional Authority to Regulate Child Sex Abuse Abroad,
10 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 375, 401 (2014).
13. See Bollinger, 798 F.3d at 203.
14. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 538 (1832).
15. See In re Can-Ah-Couqua, 29 F. 687, 688 (D. Alaska 1887).
16. See United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whisky, 108 U.S. 491, 493 (1883).
17. See United States v. Bailey, 24 F. Cas. 937, 940 (C.C.D. Tenn. 1834).
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Article will generally focus on criminal prosecution for crimes committed
abroad and will describe two laws—the PROTECT Act and the Interna-
tional Parental Kidnapping Crime Act (hereinafter, IPKC Act)18—that
are frequently implicated in Foreign Commerce Clause case law. The Ar-
ticle will then briefly outline the current state of Foreign Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, focusing especially on the four-way circuit split as
to the relationship between the Foreign Commerce Clause and the Lopez
definition of interstate commerce.
The second part of this Article will discuss the Indian Commerce
Clause, an interpretive lens that has never been applied to the Foreign
Commerce Clause. As this Article will show, there are important doctri-
nal, textual, and policy similarities between Indian Commerce Clause law
and Foreign Commerce Clause law that suggest that the former may be
useful in understanding the latter. However, as this Article will argue, the
most relevant Indian Commerce Clause law and case law occurred before
1885, when the Indian plenary power doctrine was developed and Con-
gress began to treat Native Americans less as truly sovereign nations and
more as dependent wards. Examining pre-1885 Indian Commerce Clause
law, this comment will develop a novel definition of commerce that can
also be applied in the Foreign Commerce Clause context. The Article will
conclude by using this new definition to analyze the constitutionality of
the PROTECT Act and the IPKC Act.
II. THE RIDDLE OF THE OUTWARD-LOOKING
FOREIGN COMMERCE
Until recently, courts have largely ignored the outward-looking portion
of the Foreign Commerce Clause.19 Congress has always regulated activ-
ity that might seem to qualify as foreign commerce, but historically these
regulations could be justified under another enumerated power—such as
the treaty power, provided that the regulations were made pursuant to a
treaty.20 Beginning in the 1990s, however, Congress passed several laws
targeting Americans who tried to evade domestic laws by traveling
abroad to commit crimes.21 These laws were not developed pursuant to
treaty and did not directly implicate traditional sources of Congressional
extra-territorial power.22 However, proponents of these laws argued that
they were valid under the Foreign Commerce Clause.23 Subsequent con-
victions under laws such as the PROTECT Act and the IPKC Act have
prompted a flowering of judicial inquiry into the limits of the foreign
18. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1204 (West 2016).
19. See United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1102 (9th Cir. 2006).
20. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947; 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194.
21. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 1204 (West 2015).
22. See Scott Sullivan, The Future of the Foreign Commerce Clause, 83 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1955, 1968 (2015).
23. See, e.g., Brief for the United States at *30, United States v. Bollinger, 798 F.3d 201
(4th Cir. 2015) No. 14-4086, 2014 WL 5174426.
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commerce clause.24
A. USING THE FOREIGN COMMERCE POWER TO REGULATE
AMERICAN CONDUCT ABROAD
Although some commentators suggest that the outward-looking For-
eign Commerce Clause is a repository of vast, previously untapped Con-
gressional power, modern judicial interest in the clause has developed in
response to a fairly narrow set of laws that regulate American criminal
activity overseas.25 This section explores why these laws implicate the
Foreign Commerce Clause and describes two examples of these laws.
Generally, United States criminal law is presumed not to apply extra-
territorially,26 and those laws that do explicitly criminalize conduct
abroad usually involve activity on ships or planes;27 conduct prohibited
by international treaty;28 conduct against government employees or prop-
erty;29 or conduct that has an effect on the United States as a whole,30
such as terrorist plans. Hence, an American who traveled to a foreign
country with a weak or corrupt justice system could go unpunished for a
crime committed on foreign soil that would have resulted in serious crimi-
nal penalties had the crime been committed in the United States. As long
as the harm caused by the crime was local in scope, prosecuting the
wrongdoing would have limited implications for foreign affairs, would
likely not be justified via relationship to a treaty, and would not have an
appreciable effect on U.S. domestic affairs. However, the victims of the
crime could suffer great harm and have limited legal recourse.
Child sex tourism is a prime example of this type of foreign crime,31
and one of the laws that appears most in outward-looking foreign com-
merce clause cases32 is the PROTECT Act.33 With the advent of the in-
ternet and affordable, accessible means of foreign travel, many sexual
24. See, e.g., Bollinger, 798 F.3d at 203.
25. See, e.g., Colangelo, supra note 11, at 951-52 (“Despite the mounting significance
of the Clause for modern U.S. regulatory regimes at home and abroad, it remains an in-
credibly under-analyzed source of congressional power.”); Naomi Harlin Goodno, When
the Commerce Clause Goes International: A Proposed Legal Framework for the Foreign
Commerce Clause, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1139, 1213 (2013) (“Given that there are already hun-
dreds of laws with extraterritorial application and that society is becoming increasingly
global, Congress’s foreign commerce power may become as prominent an issue as Con-
gress’s interstate commerce power.”).
26. Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 248 (2010) (“When a statute
gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”).
27. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2285(a) (2015).
28. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 175 (biological weapons).
29. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 351(a), (i) (relating to crimes of violence committed against
Members of Congress, Supreme Court justices, and certain senior executive officials).
30. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(b)(2).
31. Caliendo, supra note 12, at 378.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Bollinger, 798 F.3d 201, 210 (4th Cir. 2015); United
States v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 306 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d
784, 791-92 (6th Cir. 2015); United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006).
33. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2423 (West 2016).
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predators have begun preying on victims in developing countries.34 Al-
though some offenders travel for the primary purpose of engaging in sex-
ual tourism and pay cash for sex, other offenders, like Bollinger, are
preferential or situational.35 These offenders may engage in less formal
economic transactions—like a promise of a television set in exchange for
the opportunity to befriend a twelve-year-old boy36—or in no exchange
at all. At least some overseas child exploitation is driven by the belief that
crimes in poor countries will go unreported or at least unprosecuted.37
Four sections of the 2003 PROTECT Act address foreign commerce,
the most relevant of which for this Article is § 2423(c), which criminalizes
illicit sexual conduct by U.S. citizens or permanent residents overseas.38
Section 2423(f) defines illicit sexual conduct as a sexual act with a person
under 18 that would (1) be a federal crime of sexual abuse39 or (2) any
commercial sexual act.40 The combination of § 2423(c) and (f)(1) is some-
times called the noncommercial prong of the Act; the combination of
§ 2423(c) and (f)(2) is called  the commercial prong.41 Notably, the 2003
version of the statute revised a 2002 version which only criminalized for-
eign travel with intent to engage in a sexual act with a minor.42
Another example of the type of crime implicated in Foreign Commerce
Clause case law is international parental kidnapping.43 In 2010, the U.S.
Department of State received 1,135 new requests for assistance in the
return of 1,621 children to the United States from other countries.44 A
significant number of those children were taken to countries that signed
the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Ab-
duction, a multilateral treaty designed to streamline the return of a child
from one member nation to another.45 However, parents whose children
34. Gregory Van Houten, Testing Congress’s Foreign Commerce and Treaty Powers: A
New, (Un)constitutional Tool for Combating American Child Sex Tourists?, 53 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 177, 183 (2016).
35. Extraterritorial Sexual Exploitation of Children, U.S. DEP’T OF  JUSTICE., http://
www.justice.gov/criminal-ceos/extraterritorial-sexual-exploitation-children [https://
perma.cc/956S-3ZSJ]; Bollinger, 798 F.3d at 203.
36. See supra note 23, at *12-13; United States v. Bianchi, 386 F. App’x 156 (3d Cir.
2010).
37. Van Houten, supra note 34, at 183; see Bollinger, 798 F.3d at 204.
38. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2423(c) (West 2016).
39. § 2423(f)(1).
40. § 2423(f)(2).
41. Jessica E. Notebaert, The Search for A Constitutional Justification for the Noncom-
mercial Prong of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c), 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 949, 953 (2013).
42. § 2423(b). Establishing intent would likely be difficult for predators like Larry Bol-
linger who traveled to Haiti for legitimate reasons and, allegedly, did not begin to abuse
children until several years after he arrived in the country. See Bollinger, 798 F.3d at 204-
05.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Shahani-Jahromi, 286 F. Supp. 2d 723, 734 (E.D. Va.
2003).
44. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, REPORT ON COMPLIANCE
WITH THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD AB-
DUCTION (2014).
45. See Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction art.
1, opened for signature Oct. 25, 1980; 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9011 (formerly cited as 42 U.S.C.
§§ 11601-11611); 1343 U.N.T.S. 89.
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are taken to non-signatory or non-compliant countries may face a pro-
tracted, expensive—and often unsuccessful—battle to enforce an Ameri-
can court order in a foreign country.46
The IPKC Act was passed in 1993 in the hopes of further deterring
parental abduction and giving the United States jurisdiction over parental
abductors who flee to other countries.47 The Act criminalizes the removal
or retention of a child “who has been in the United States” from the
United States by anyone—regardless of nationality—provided they have
the “intent to obstruct the lawful exercise of parental rights.”48 People
convicted of violating the IPKC Act face fines or imprisonment of up to
three years.49 The Act was the first federal law to criminalize interna-
tional parental kidnapping and augments state custody and parental kid-
napping laws which may be difficult to enforce on an international basis
or—depending on the state—may not exist.50
Since its inception, indictment under the IPKC Act has only been used
in very limited circumstances.51 Nevertheless, the law gives U.S. law en-
forcement enormous power to, for instance, reach into a foreign country
with whom the United States has no treaty regarding parental kidnapping
and assert jurisdiction over a non-U.S. citizen in order to facilitate the
return of a non-U.S. citizen child.52
The PROTECT Act and the IPKC Act raise important questions about
the scope of the Foreign Commerce Clause because they criminalize fun-
damentally local conduct abroad, without reference to an international
treaty. Although the PROTECT Act’s foreign commerce and travel pro-
visions were enlarged53 after the United States signed the Optional Pro-
tocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography,
a supplement to a United Nations treaty that required signatories to take
steps to prohibit child prostitution, trafficking, and pornography,54 the
Optional Protocol is not mentioned as justification for the Act in any of
the legislative materials accompanying the 2002 revision.55 Given Con-
gress’s stated preference for pursuing abducted children through the
46. Jason Nitz, “Splitting the Baby” Internationally: Evaluating the “Least Restrictive”
Conundrum When Protecting Children from International Parental Abduction, 16
SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. & SOC. JUST. 417, 420-21 (2014).
47. Id. at 422-23; Donyale N. Leslie, A Difficult Situation Made Harder: A Parent’s
Choice Between Civil Remedies and Criminal Charges in International Child Abduction, 36
GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 381, 394 (2008).
48. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1204 (West 2015).
49. Id.
50. Leslie, supra note 47, at 394.
51. Id. at 394-95. Congress has made clear that parents seeking the return of a child
should always use the Hague Convention if possible. Id. Some commentators point out
that imposing criminal penalties on the perpetrator only makes the return of a child less
likely. Id. In addition, prosecution under the IPKC Act still requires some cooperation
from the foreign country in extraditing the offending parent. Nitz, supra note 46, at 433.
52. See § 1204.
53. See id.; Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act of 1998, PL 105–314,
October 30, 1998, 112 Stat 2974.
54. G.A. Res  2171/A-27531, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263 (May 25, 2000).
55. See Notebaert, supra note 41, at 955.
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Hague Convention,56 the IPKC—by definition—criminalizes acts that are
not subject to outstanding treaty. Hence, neither Act can be justified
under the Necessary and Proper Clause as a way of implementing treaty
provisions.57
Extraterritorial regulation has also been justified as a way of effectuat-
ing the broad—and some instances, extra-constitutional—power the leg-
islative branch holds over foreign affairs.58 However, while the conduct
targeted by the PROTECT Act and the IPKC Act is abhorrent, it argua-
bly lacks the type of widespread political or economic implications that
usually characterize conduct regulated under the foreign affairs power.59
Child kidnapping and child abuse have historically been treated as local
matters that are best left to the supervision of states at home and foreign
states abroad.60 It is unlikely that the PROTECT Act or the IPKC Act
could be justified under Congress’s power to effectuate executive power
over foreign affairs.
If the IPKC Act and the PROTECT act are to be constitutional, then,
they must fall within the scope of activity that can be regulated under the
Foreign Commerce Clause. However, both statutes criminalize conduct
that strains the definition of commerce set forth in United States v. Lo-
pez.61 Neither the kidnapping contemplated by the former nor the abuse
contemplated by the latter necessarily require the use of channels or in-
strumentalities of commerce.62 Moreover, both crimes may occur without
an economic transaction; therefore, it is difficult to show any kind of sub-
stantial effect from kidnapping or abuse on interstate or foreign com-
merce.63 The holding in United States v. Morrison—which rejected the
possibility that gender-motivated violence is an economic activity—
strongly suggests that child kidnapping and non-commercial child sexual
abuse would also fail to qualify as commerce under the Lopez defini-
56. See Leslie, supra note 47, at 394.
57. But see United States v. Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 798 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (sug-
gesting in dicta that the constitutionally contentious portions of the foreign commerce
clause could be authorized under the Necessary and Proper Clause pursuant to implement-
ing the Optional Protocol, thus sidestepping the foreign commerce clause issue altogether).
58. United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 805 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Congressional power
to pass those laws necessary and property to effectuate the enumerated powers of the
Constitution is nowhere broader and more important than in the realm of foreign
relations.”).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)
(describing use of the plenary power doctrine in order to enact an embargo on arms ship-
ments to South America).
60. See, e.g., Thomas L. Hafemeister, Castles Made of Sand? Rediscovering Child
Abuse and Society’s Response, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 819, 831, 835 (2010).
61. 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (holding that Congress may regulate the channels and
instrumentalities of interstate commerce and “those activities having a substantial relation
to interstate commerce”).
62. Under the IPKC Act, mere retention of a child outside the United States is a
crime. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1204 (West 2015).
63. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615-19 (2000) (holding that acts of
violence against women had an “attenuated” effect, and not a substantial one, on interstate
commerce).
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tion.64 Hence, the PROTECT Act and the IPKC Act beg the question of
whether the Lopez definition of commerce applies to the Foreign Com-
merce Clause.
B. THE OUTWARD-LOOKING FOREIGN COMMERCE CLAUSE IS A
DEEPLY UNSETTLED AND UNEXPLORED PORTION
OF THE LAW
Case law regarding the scope of the outward-looking foreign commerce
clause is highly unsettled. Most courts that have considered the issue use
the Lopez definition of commerce as a jumping off point.65 However,
courts differ widely on how the Lopez definition applies—if at all—to the
foreign prong of the commerce clause.
A few courts have relied on what Professor Saikrishna Prakash calls
“the presumption of intrasentence uniformity” throughout the Com-
merce Clause to conclude that the foreign commerce clause employs the
same definition of commerce as the interstate commerce clause.66 In
United States v. Al-Maliki, the Sixth Circuit suggested in dicta that the
noncommercial prong of the PROTECT Act67 is likely unconstitutional
because the activity regulated under the noncommercial prong does not
fall into any of the Lopez categories.68 Relatedly, a district court in the
District of Columbia held that the IPKC Act was valid under the Foreign
Commerce Clause because the statute included a “jurisdictional hook”
requiring movement in foreign commerce that the court likened to the
interstate jurisdictional element required under Lopez.69
However, the majority of circuits and other courts which have ex-
amined the issue reject intrasentence uniformity in favor of the idea that
congressional power under the Foreign Commerce Clause was intended
to be greater than power under the Interstate Commerce Clause.70 The
courts that favor this broad reading of the Foreign Commerce Clause fall
into two camps.
The first group recognizes the broader scope of the Foreign Commerce
Clause, but tries to fit challenged law within the Lopez categories in or-
der to leave room for future guidance from the Supreme Court.71 In
United States v. Pendleton, for instance, the Third Circuit upheld the con-
64. See id.
65. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2006).
66. See Saikrishna Prakash, Our Three Commerce Clauses and the Presumption of In-
trasentence Uniformity, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1149, 1149 (2003).
67. See Notebaert, supra note 41.
68. United States v. Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d 784, 794 (6th Cir. 2015) cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
204 (2015).
69. United States v. Homaune, 898 F. Supp. 2d 153, 159-160 (D.D.C. 2012).
70. United States v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 306 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Notwithstanding
Chief Justice Marshall’s statement in Gibbons, the three subclauses of Article 1, § 8, cl. 3
have acquired markedly different meanings over time.”).
71. See, e.g., id. at 308 (“Although we agree . . . that the Interstate Commerce Clause
developed to address ‘unique federalism concerns’ that are absent in the foreign commerce
context, we are hesitant to dispose of Lopez’s ‘time-tested’ framework without further
guidance from the Supreme Court.”).
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stitutionality of § 2423(c) of the PROTECT Act by arguing that it
targeted “American citizens [who] were using the channels of foreign
commerce to travel to countries where ‘dire poverty and . . . lax enforce-
ment’ would allow them to ‘escape prosecution’ for their crimes of child
sexual abuse.”72 Similarly, in United States v. Martinez, a district court in
the Western District of Texas ruled against a § 2423(c) challenge on the
grounds that even the noncommercial prong of the law73 concerned activ-
ities that were substantially related to foreign commerce.74
In contrast, the second group—which includes the Third, Fourth and
Ninth Circuits—suggests a new definition of commerce that reflects Con-
gress’ broad power under the foreign commerce clause. In United States v.
Clark, a case that questioned the constitutionality of the commercial
prong of § 2423(c), the Ninth Circuit held that laws that fall under Con-
gress’s foreign commerce clause power must have “a constitutionally ten-
able nexus with foreign commerce.”75 Applying the rational basis test
from Gonzales v. Raich, the Ninth Circuit found that “§ 2423(c)’s combi-
nation of requiring travel in foreign commerce, coupled with engagement
in a commercial transaction while abroad, implicates foreign commerce
to a constitutionally adequate degree.”76 In United States v. Bianchi—
which involved an American citizen who raped children in Romania and
Moldova after befriending their families—the Third Circuit applied the
Clark test to uphold the constitutionality of the non-commercial prong of
the PROTECT Act.77
More recently, in United States v. Bollinger, the Fourth Circuit pro-
posed a definition of foreign commerce that includes the channels and
instrumentalities of foreign commerce and “activities that demonstrably
affect such commerce.”78 Examining Lopez,79 the Fourth Circuit found
that the first two Lopez categories were applicable abroad, but rejected
the third category as “unduly demanding in the foreign context,” noting
that the substantial effects test was developed in response to federalism
concerns.80 Requiring that an activity demonstrably affect foreign com-
merce implicates a much broader array of activity than the interstate
commerce clause but still precludes regulation of activities with an “imag-
72. Id. at 310; see also United States v. Flath, 845 F. Supp. 2d 951, 955-56 (E.D. Wis.
2012). In Bollinger, the Fourth Circuit points out that this analysis means that Congress is
free to criminalize any foreign conduct that  occurs after an American citizen travels out of
the United States because travel will always implicate the “channels” of commerce. 798
F.3d 201, 216 (4th Cir. 2015).
73. See Notebaert, supra note 41.
74. United States v. Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 806 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
75. 435 F.3d 1100, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006).
76. Id.
77. United States v. Bianchi, 386 F. App’x 156, 162 (3d Cir. 2010) (“The Supreme
Court’s broad interpretation of the Foreign Commerce Clause applies with equal force to
the non-commercial sexual conduct prong of § 2423(c), and Bianchi has simply not made
the required ‘plain showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds’ by enact-
ing that prong of the statute.”).
78. 798 F.3d 201, 215-16 (4th Cir. 2015).
79. See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
80. Bollinger, 798 F.3d at 215.
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inable or hypothetical” effect.81
Under the new test it proposed, the Fourth Circuit held that the non-
commercial prong of § 2423(c) was a valid exercise of Congress’ foreign
commerce clause power because § 2423(c) is part of a larger effort to
close legal loopholes that formerly allowed sex tourists to abuse children
abroad with impunity.82 As the Fourth Circuit explained, “prohibiting the
non-commercial sexual abuse of children by Americans abroad has a de-
monstrable effect on . . . the commercial sex industry” and, thus, is per-
missible under the foreign commerce clause,83 even though the regulation
of non-commercial sexual assault on women does not have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.84
To summarize, a few themes run through the deeply unsettled land-
scape of foreign commerce clause jurisprudence. Although most courts
concur that the interstate definition of commerce does not apply in the
Foreign Commerce Clause context, they continue to use the Lopez defi-
nition as the framework for their analysis. The recent Fourth Circuit deci-
sion in Bollinger takes the boldest step toward establishing a truly novel
definition of commerce. Finally, the current four-way circuit split on this
issue speaks to the need for greater foreign commerce clause guidance.85
The Supreme Court should grant certiorari on a foreign commerce clause
case to bring clarity to this area of the law.
III. EXAMINING THE FOREIGN COMMERCE CLAUSE
THROUGH THE LENS OF THE INDIAN
COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Indian Commerce Clause is an underutilized source for interpret-
ing the Foreign Commerce Clause. No court that has analyzed the defini-
tion of commerce under the Foreign Commerce Clause has looked to
Indian Commerce Clause law for guidance. One commentator on the
subject explicitly rejected using Indian Commerce Clause law on the
grounds that U.S.-tribal relationships are unique and have limited appli-
cation to international relationships.86 This section suggests that the In-
dian Commerce Clause parallels the Foreign Commerce Clause in four
key ways and that reservations about the applicability of Indian Com-
merce Clause law can be lessened by focusing on cases and law prior to
the Supreme Court’s announcement of plenary power over Native Amer-
ican affairs in United States v. Kagama.87
81. Id. at 216.
82. Id. at 218. The intent before travel requirement of the 2002 version of the law
prevented prosecution of many abusers.
83. Id.
84. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615-19 (2000).
85. See United States v. Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d 784, 794 (6th Cir. 2015) cert. denied, 136 S.
Ct. 204 (2015); United States v. Bollinger, 798 F.3d 201, 215-16 (4th Cir. 2015); United
States v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 308 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100,
1114 (9th Cir. 2006).
86. Goodno, supra note 25, at 1191-92.
87. 118 U.S. 375, 378-79 (1886).
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Examining law and case law from this period suggests that under the
pre-1885 Indian Commerce Clause, “commerce” was defined as commer-
cial and diplomatic relations between sovereign nations and activity that
demonstrably affects willingness or ability of foreign countries or individ-
uals to engage in commercial or diplomatic activities with the United
States. Moreover, this power is limited by the sovereignty of other na-
tions and—to a lesser extent—by an independent obligation to protect
the welfare of foreign nationals. Applying this definition to the Foreign
Commerce Clause yields sensible results: upholding the constitutionality
of the PROTECT Act, yet limiting the ability of the IPKC Act to
criminalize the conduct of non-Americans in regard to non-American
children.
A. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN INDIAN COMMERCE CLAUSE LAW AND
FOREIGN COMMERCE CLAUSE LAW: SOVEREIGNTY,
INEQUALITY, AND THE LURE OF LIMITLESS POWER
1. Textual Similarities Between the Foreign Commerce Clause and
Indian Commerce Clause
Despite widespread reliance on Interstate Commerce Clause law in
Foreign Commerce Clause cases, the Foreign Commerce Clause is textu-
ally closer to the Indian Commerce Clause than to the Interstate Com-
merce Clause. As Professor Goodno points out, the first two concern
commerce “with Indian tribes” or “with foreign nations,” while the latter
concerns commerce “among the several [s]tates.”88
Textual interpretations of the Commerce Clause ascribe importance to
this difference. Professor Colangelo, for instance, draws on Gibbons v.
Ogden to define “among” in the commerce clause as meaning “intermin-
gled with,” such that “[c]ommerce among the States, cannot stop at the
external boundary line of each State, but may be introduced into the inte-
rior.”89 In contrast, “with” requires a nexus with the United States.90 Tex-
tually, Professor Colangelo argues, Congress is precluded under the
Foreign Commerce Clause from regulating local foreign conduct absent a
joint regulatory scheme with the foreign nation in question.91 In Lopez
terms, Professor Colangelo suggests that Congress may properly regulate
channels of foreign commerce with the United States, instrumentalities of
foreign commerce with a constitutionally sufficient U.S. nexus, and activi-
ties with a substantial effect on foreign commerce provided that the effect
“would reasonably authorize U.S. jurisdiction under international law.”92
88. Goodno, supra note 25, at 1152, 1188; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis
added).
89. Colangelo, supra note 11, at 972 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 193-94
(1824)).
90. Id. at 973-74.
91. Id. at 975.
92. Id. at 1039.
544 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
This distinction is not merely academic. Both Professor Colangelo and
Jessica Notebaert—who suggest similar restrictions on the Foreign Com-
merce Clause power—concur that under this restricted definition of for-
eign commerce, the non-commercial prong of the PROTECT Act is
unconstitutional.93 The textual similarities between the Indian Commerce
Clause and Foreign Commerce Clause, therefore, are noteworthy and
suggest that it may be worthwhile to examine the latter through the lens
of the former.
2. A Shared Freedom from Federalism
As an interpretive device, Indian Commerce Clause jurisprudence has
the added advantage of not being colored by questions of federalism. Al-
though some states made early overtures to establish independent rela-
tionships with Native Americans, the framers intended that the federal
government should exclusively oversee Indian affairs.94 Hence, unlike the
Lopez definition, the definition of commerce that developed under the
Indian Commerce Clause was not influenced by the need to reserve cer-
tain powers to the states.95
Some courts interpreting the Foreign Commerce Clause hesitate to
adopt the Lopez definition because they believe it was crafted specifically
to respond to the unique requirements of federalism.96 In Bollinger, for
instance, the Fourth Circuit wrote that the “assumption [that interstate
jurisprudence should be applied to the foreign commerce clause] is belied
by decades of Supreme Court cases that have consistently interpreted
Congress’s interstate authority against the backdrop of . . . federalism
concerns that are inapposite in the international arena.”97 Similarly, in
Clark, the Ninth Circuit questioned the applicability of the Lopez frame-
work to foreign commerce clause issues given that “[t]his framework de-
veloped in response to the unique federalism concerns that define
congressional authority in the interstate context.”98
In Al-Maliki, the Sixth Circuit appears to undermine this argument by
suggesting an analogy between the limits federalism places on Interstate
Commerce Clause law and the limits foreign sovereignty and the rights of
individual Americans place on Foreign Commerce Clause law.99 How-
ever, the Sixth Circuit never explains why Indian Commerce Clause
law—which is riddled with concerns of Native American sovereignty and
tales of individual Americans anxious to contract with Native Ameri-
cans—is not even more analogous to Foreign Commerce Clause law.
93. Id. at 1039-40; Notebaert, supra note 41, at 974-75.
94. Goodno, supra note 25, at 1189.
95. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1116 (9th Cir. 2006) (“At times,
forcing foreign commerce cases into the domestic commerce rubric is a bit like one of the
stepsisters trying to don Cinderella’s glass slipper . . .”).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Bollinger, 798 F.3d 201, 210 (4th Cir. 2015).
97. Id.
98. Clark, 435 F.3d at 1103.
99. United States v. Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d 784, 793 (6th Cir. 2015).
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3. The Siren’s Song of Limitless Federal Power
In the absence of federalism-based limits on the type of activities Con-
gress can regulate under the Indian Commerce Clause and the Foreign
Commerce Clause, courts have struggled to determine if power in these
areas is limited by another principle. The tantalizing possibility of essen-
tially unlimited—or even extra-Constitutional—power over U.S.-Native
American relations or U.S.-foreign commercial relations has variously
tempted and repelled the courts.
Early Indian Commerce Clause law suggested that congressional
power was limited by tribal sovereignty. In the early years of the country,
interaction with Native American tribes hewed closely to principles of
international law.100 At the time, Native American tribes were autono-
mous groups capable of entangling the young nation in “expensive and
protracted wars.”101 Accordingly, the United States built relationships
with tribes in the same way it did with other sovereign nations—by
treaty.102 Some treaties ceded considerable power to the federal govern-
ment.103 However, a significant number also limited federal interference
in tribal affairs.104 In contrast, early laws that were passed under the In-
dian Commerce Clause were limited in scope. For instance, a series of
statutes known as the Nonintercourse Act were passed to regulate trade
and crime between Americans and Native Americans, but did not pre-
sume to interfere with intra-tribal affairs.105
In 1885, however, Congress responded to frustration about a recent
Supreme Court decision that affirmed strong limits on federal regulation
of intra-tribal crime by passing the Major Crimes Act.106 The Act, which
gave federal courts jurisdiction over serious crimes committed by Native
Americans, was an unprecedented assertion of federal power into what
had long been purely internal tribal affairs.107 In 1885, a stabbing on the
Hoopa Valley Reservation by Kagama, a Yurok Native American,
presented the first opportunity for the Supreme Court to review the con-
100. Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories,
and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV.
1, 28 (2002).
101. Id. at 27.
102. Nathan Speed, Examining the Interstate Commerce Clause Through the Lens of the
Indian Commerce Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 467, 471 (2007).
103. See, e.g., Treaty Between the United States of America and the Klamath and
Moadoc Tribes and Yahooskin band of Snake Indians art. IX, Oct. 14, 1864, 16 Stat. 707.
104. Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination, 84 N.C.
L. REV. 779, 792 (2006).
105. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137; Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729;
Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139; Act of Mar. 3, 1799, ch. 46, 1 Stat. 743; Act of May
19, 1796, ch. 30, 1 Stat. 469; Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 19, 1 Stat. 329. The statutes are sub-
stantively very similar to each other. See, e.g., New York ex rel. Cutler v. Dibble, 62 U.S.
(21 How.) 366, 367 (1858). There are six statutes because each statute expired within two to
four years of being passed and had to be renewed.
106. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 362 (1885).
107. Speed, supra note 102, at 479-480.
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stitutionality of the law.108
The Court upheld the law but acknowledged that only “a very strained
construction” of the Indian Commerce Clause could support “a system of
criminal laws for Indians living peaceably in their reservations.”109 In-
stead, the Court found that federal power over Native American affairs
was necessary—whether or not it was authorized by the Constitution—
because Native Americans were wards of the state.110 As Justice Miller
wrote, “from [the tribes’] very weakness and helplessness, so largely due
to the course of dealing of the federal government with them, and the
treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of [federal]
protection, and with it the power.”111
Following Kagama, the Court enlarged the extra-constitutional power
Justice Miller first described into what came to be regarded as Congress’s
“plenary power” over Native American affairs.112 The Indian plenary
power doctrine “quickly infiltrated the [Supreme] Court’s analysis even
in straight Commerce Clause cases” and contributed to the speedy de-
mise of Native American sovereignty.113 In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, for
instance, the Court relied on the plenary power doctrine to uphold Con-
gressional action stripping Native Americans of tribal land notwithstand-
ing pre-existing treaties to the contrary.114 Moreover, the Court found
that Congress’s plenary power was not subject to judicial review.115 De-
spite widespread criticism, the plenary power doctrine remained an im-
portant force in Native American affairs until the mid-twentieth
century.116
Foreign Commerce Clause jurisprudence is much less developed than
Indian Commerce Clause law in terms of articulating the scope of federal
power. Certainly, the Supreme Court has stated  that congressional
power under the Foreign Commerce Clause is “exclusive and plenary”
and therefore “its exercise may not be limited, qualified, or impeded to
any extent by state action.”117 Most recently, in Japan Line, Ltd. v.
County of Los Angeles, a dormant foreign commerce clause case, the
Court stated in dicta that congressional power granted by the foreign
commerce clause was greater than its interstate counterpart because
“Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce may be restricted by
108. Mark Stuart Weiner, Americans Without Law: The Racial Boundaries of Citizen-
ship 45 (2006).
109. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378 (1886).
110. Id. at 384.
111. Id.
112. Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 478 (1899).
113. Cleveland, supra note 100, at 63-64.
114. 187 U.S. 553, 565-67 (1903).
115. Id. at 568 (“[A]s Congress possessed full power in the matter, the judiciary cannot
question or inquire into the motives which prompted the enactment of this legislation. If
injury was occasioned. . .by the use made by Congress of its power, relief must be sought
by an appeal to that body for redress, and not to the courts.”).
116. Cleveland, supra note 100, at 77.
117. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Illinois v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 56-57 (1933).
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considerations of federalism and state sovereignty.”118 Both these deci-
sions have been cited in outward-looking foreign commerce clause cases
for the general proposition that power under the Foreign Commerce
Clause is greater than the power under the Interstate Commerce
Clause.119 This begs the question, how much greater?
Generally, the Commerce power is “complete in itself, may be exer-
cised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are
prescribed in the constitution.”120 In United States v. Al-Maliki, the Sixth
Circuit suggested that the Foreign Commerce power is limited by the sov-
ereignty of other nations and by the liberties granted to individual citi-
zens.121 However, the Ninth Circuit discusses no inherent constitutional
limitation and simply gestures broadly toward “Congress’s sweeping pow-
ers over foreign commerce.”122 Still other courts considering non-Foreign
Commerce Clause matters suggest that Congress—like the executive
branch—may have some sort of extra-constitutional power over foreign
affairs that proceeds from the United States’ status as an independent
nation.123 In United States v. Curtiss-Wright, the Supreme Court wrote
that “the investment of the federal government with the powers of exter-
nal sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Consti-
tution.”124 This suggests a colorable argument that federal power over
foreign commerce is not merely plenary, but extra-constitutional. After
118. Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles Cty., 441 U.S. 434, 448, n.13 (1979).
119. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Japan
Line as “evidence that the Founders intended the scope of the foreign commerce power to
be . . . greater  . . . “). This reliance on Japan Line has been criticized by academics. See
Colangelo, supra note 11, at 968; see also Notebaert, supra note 41, at 969. As Professor
Colangelo points out, the Japan Line holding occurred in the context of an interaction
between a state and a foreign nation in which “the need for national uniformity and the
power to override state law” were paramount. Colangelo, supra note 11, at 968. However,
outward-looking foreign commerce clause cases consider the ability of a nation to legislate
within the borders of another nation. Id. State-federal conflicts are not an issue in these
cases and the need for national uniformity is not implicated because the nation is legislat-
ing as a whole. Id. Hence, conclusions reached about the scope of the dormant commerce
clause may not be apposite to questions about the scope of the outward-looking foreign
commerce clause. Id. It is possible that the many courts which have quoted Japan Line in
support of an expansive outward-looking foreign commerce clause power do so not be-
cause the reasoning Japan Line uses is exactly applicable to the outward-looking foreign
commerce clause but because the Japan Line footnote sums up a widespread conviction
that congressional power in foreign affairs should be broad. See, e.g., Clark, 435 F.3d at
1109 (quoting Japan Line, but later asserting “[i]n considering whether Congress exceeded
its power under the Foreign Commerce Clause in enacting § 2423(c), we ground our analy-
sis in the fundamental principle that ‘[i]t is an essential attribute of [Congress’s power over
foreign commerce] that it is exclusive and plenary.’”).
120. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824).
121. United States v. Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d 784, 793 (6th Cir. 2015) cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
204 (2015).
122. United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006).
123. Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545, 545 (9th Cir. 1961) (“The powers of the
government and the Congress in regard to sovereignty are broader than the powers pos-
sessed in relation to internal matters.”) (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F.Supp.
479, 490-91 (S.D.Cal. 1960), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Rocha v. U.S. 288 F.2d
545).
124. 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (emphasis added).
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all, why should the foreign affairs power granted to the executive branch
be so much greater than the foreign commerce power granted to the leg-
islative branch? For that matter, why should “[t]he powers to declare and
wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic
relations with other sovereignties. . . have vested in the federal govern-
ment as necessary concomitants of nationality,” while the ability to regu-
late commerce with foreign nations does not?125
The answers to these questions have been sources of anxiety for com-
mentators and courts who have pointed out that an unbounded Foreign
Commerce Clause power could justify intrusive U.S. regulation of “for-
eign labor, manufacturing, production, and employment practices”126 or
micromanagement of American conduct abroad.127 As an established
body of law that has wrestled with a “limitless” federal power and, later,
an extra-constitutional power over US-Native American commerce, In-
dian Commerce Clause jurisprudence may shed important light on this
matter.
4. Shared Regulation of Relationships Fraught with Inequality
and Exploitation
Another similarity between the Foreign Commerce Clause and the In-
dian Commerce Clause is that both give Congress the power to regulate
relationships that are deeply unequal and may be ripe for exploitation.
Indian Commerce Clause law is fairly frank about the profound power
imbalance between the United States and Native American tribes. Native
American-U.S. relations have long been colored by the widely criticized
“doctrine of discovery,” which suggests that American colonists had a
right to own Native American land because they were the first Europeans
to discover it and that this right passed to the United States upon the
country’s foundation.128 The relationship between the United States and
Native American tribes has also been compared to a trust, complete with
an attendant federal responsibility to act in favor of tribal interests.129
These overlapping and intertwining doctrines have inspired policies and
cases that variously regard Native Americans as savages standing in the
way of manifest destiny,130 wards in need of guidance from the United
States,131 and vulnerable parties to be protected from exploitation.132
125. Id.
126. Colangelo, supra note 11, at 1017.
127. United States v. Bollinger, 798 F.3d 201, 216 (4th Cir. 2015).
128. DAVID E. WILKINS, ET AL., UNEVEN GROUND: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY
AND FEDERAL LAW 20 (2001).
129. United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 165 (2011).
130. See JOHN H. VINZANT, THE SUPREME COURT’S ROLE IN AMERICAN INDIAN POL-
ICY 50 (2009) (quoting Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Francis A. Walker, as saying of the
end to treaty making between the United States and tribes, “This is, indeed, the only hope
of salvation for the aborigines of the continent. If they stand up against the progress of
civilization. . .they must be relentlessly crushed.”).
131. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
132. See Act of Aug. 7, 1789, 1 Stat. 50.
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In contrast, Foreign Commerce Clause case law suggests by its silence
that whatever power imbalance may exist between the United States and
another country is merely incidental. In Bollinger, for instance, the defen-
dant’s crime was facilitated by his privileged status as an American expa-
triate in a far less wealthy country and by the poverty of the children he
preyed upon.133 Despite this, the opinion makes little mention of the
deep disparity in power between the parties.134 Intuitively, this implicit
policy might seem to make sense. Congress has the power to regulate
commerce with many countries, including those that are as economically
stable and politically powerful as the United States. However, as dis-
cussed earlier, the fact of the matter is that laws authorized under the
Foreign Commerce Clause tend to address the exploitation of vulnerable
parties by Americans overseas.135
It is possible that this will not be a temporary feature of the law. For
instance, the scope of federal power under the Interstate Commerce
Clause and Curtiss-Wright may be permanently enlarged in such a way
that it is unlikely that the Foreign Commerce Clause will ever be relied
upon for anything other than regulating American conduct overseas in
matters that do not implicate foreign relations, are not covered by a
treaty, and largely fall outside the Lopez definition of commerce.136 Ac-
cordingly, a California district court recently upheld the constitutionality
of a statute prohibiting the foreign murder of a U.S. national—a question
that might otherwise prompt a discussion of the limits of the foreign com-
merce clause—by citing Curtiss-Wright in support of general federal “ple-
nary power over external affairs.”137 Similarly, in a 2003 international
child-kidnapping case in which the defendant challenged the application
of the IPKC Act to an abduction that occurred in Iran, the constitutional-
ity of the Act was upheld based on Congress’ general ability to regulate
the channels of interstate commerce.138
Hence, it may be that regulating unequal nation to nation and Ameri-
can to foreign citizen relationships is not an incidental trait of contempo-
rary Foreign Commerce Clause law, but rather a defining characteristic of
how the Foreign Commerce Clause power will be deployed in fact. If this
is the case, then the Indian Commerce Clause becomes even more rele-
vant as an interpretive lens for the Foreign Commerce Clause.
133. United States v. Bollinger, 798 F.3d 201, 206-07(4th Cir. 2015) (noting in the fact
section of the opinion that impoverished children in Haiti often offer sex in exchange for
food and that Bollinger appeared to believe his crimes in Haiti would go unpunished).
134. See id.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 52-59.
136. Goodno, supra note 25, at 1144 (“There are potentially hundreds of federal laws
that give Congress the power to regulate the conduct of U.S. citizens abroad, both in the
civil and criminal context.”).
137. United States v. Brimager, No. 13CR2381 JM, 2015 WL 4923646, at *7 (S.D. Cal.
Aug. 18, 2015).
138. United States v. Shahani-Jahromi, 286 F. Supp. 2d 723, 734 (E.D. Va. 2003)
(“While defendant is correct that the [IPKC Act] targets interference with lawful parental
rights, it does not do so in the abstract; it specifically targets interference with lawful paren-
tal rights that impedes movement in the channels of commerce.”).
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B. FOCUSING THE LENS: INDIAN COMMERCE CLAUSE LAW PRIOR
TO 1885
Indian Commerce Clause law has the potential to suggest important
insights into the scope of the outward-looking Foreign Commerce Clause.
However, no court has looked to Indian Commerce Clause law for gui-
dance in interpreting the Foreign Commerce Clause and the few com-
mentators who considered this possibility ultimately rejected it.139 This
reluctance to use the Indian Commerce Clause as an interpretive device
may be due to what many sources call the “special relationship” between
the United States and Native American tribes, suggesting a relationship
that is so specific to its origins and circumstances that it has no applica-
tion elsewhere.140 In fact, the Supreme Court has stated that Native
American tribes are not foreign nations, but rather “domestic dependent
nations” that are subject to the plenary power of Congress over Indian
affairs.141
This drawback is resolved, however, by focusing on Indian Commerce
Clause laws and cases prior to the passage of the Major Crimes Act.
Before 1885, Congress and the courts generally treated Native Americans
as autonomous nations that—if not perfectly sovereign—were entitled to
a protected sphere of sovereignty within the borders of their territory.142
The laws passed and cases decided under the Indian Commerce Clause
during this time represent a substantial body of American law concerning
nations whose citizens conducted cross-border commercial and non-com-
mercial transactions with a frequency and intimacy that characterizes
U.S.-foreign relations in the age of the internet and affordable airfare.
The nations in question had different cultures and different levels of re-
sources at their disposal. Accordingly, laws and cases from this period
reflect strikingly modern concerns about cultural conflict and
exploitation.
Of course, this approach all but pre-supposes there is no extra-constitu-
tional power over foreign commerce. However, there is compelling sup-
port for this assumption. The Curtiss-Wright doctrine has been heavily
criticized as “a twentieth-century anomaly” that should “be brought back
into the fold of mainstream constitutional jurisprudence.”143 Indian Com-
merce Clause law suggests the destruction that an extra-territorial power
over commerce could cause in U.S.-foreign relations: many commenta-
tors point to Kagama as a turning point in U.S.-Native American rela-
tions that led to the evisceration of Native American sovereignty.144 For
these reasons, pre-1885 Indian Commerce Clause law has more applica-
139. Goodno, supra note 25, at 1191.
140. See, e.g., LaPier v. McCormick, 986 F.2d 303, 305 (9th Cir. 1993).
141. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030 (2014).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 128-133.
143. Cleveland, supra note 100, at 6.
144. See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 100, at 62.
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bility than modern Indian Commerce Clause law to modern Foreign
Commerce Clause law.
C. THE DEFINITION OF COMMERCE UNDER THE INDIAN
COMMERCE CLAUSE
Under the pre-1885 Indian Commerce Clause, “commerce” was a
broad concept that encompassed trade but also non-commercial in-
terchanges and general diplomatic relations between Native Americans
and American settlers. The Indian Commerce Clause and the Treaty
Clause are the only two constitutional provisions that permit the federal
government to regulate relationships with Native American tribes.145
Hence, any law passed regarding Native Americans that was not made
pursuant to treaty must involve the regulation of commerce. The diverse
set of laws made to govern U.S.-Native American relations suggests a
fluid definition of commerce that could succinctly be described as com-
mercial and diplomatic relations and any American activity that might
influence Native American willingness or ability to engage in those
relations.
Early laws passed under the Indian Commerce Clause reflect this fluid-
ity. For instance, a series of six statutes, known as the Nonintercourse
Act, that were passed to regulate commerce between Americans and Na-
tive Americans, focused on two major areas: regulation of trade and pun-
ishment of crime.146 Regulation of trade focused largely on limiting
access to Native American trade by providing that a license must be ob-
tained in order to trade with Native Americans147 and that land sales be-
tween Native Americans and U.S. citizens were forbidden, except
according to the terms of a treaty.148 Although this might seem like a
purely commercial regulation, it likely arose as a continuation of similar
colonial laws that sought to limit violent Native American-colonial
clashes following exploitation of Native Americans by unscrupulous colo-
nial traders.149 As Gregory Ablavsky points out in his recent article Be-
yond the Indian Commerce Clause, colonial trade with Native Americans
was not merely a means of commerce, but also “a form of diplomacy and
politics, ‘the defining feature of Native-colonial relations.’”150 Accord-
ingly, a similar provision in the Northwest Ordinance of 1789 states that
“[the] utmost good faith should always be observed towards Indians; their
145. See U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8, cl. 3.
146. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137; Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729;
Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139; Act of Mar. 3, 1799, ch. 46, 1 Stat. 743; Act of May
19, 1796, ch. 30, 1 Stat. 469; Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 19, 1 Stat. 329. The statutes are sub-
stantively very similar to each other. See, e.g., New York ex rel. Cutler v. Dibble, 62 U.S.
(21 How.) 366, 367 (1858). There are six statutes because each statute expired within two to
four years of being passed and had to be renewed.
147. Act of July 22, 1790 § 1.
148. Id. § 4.
149. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2567-68 (2013).
150. Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012, 1030
(2015).
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land and property shall never be taken from them without their
consent.”151
Other provisions of the Nonintercourse Act speak more directly to the
way in which “commerce” was taken to encompass general diplomatic
relations. Provisions of the 1793 Act, for instance, barred American set-
tlers from taking over Native American land and assured Native Ameri-
cans that they would not be subject to state commerce laws.152 The Act
also provided for criminal sanctions for U.S. citizens who committed any
crime upon, or trespass against, the person or property of any peaceable
and “friendly Indian or Indians.”153
Jurisdiction over crimes involving Native Americans or occurring on
Native American territory has been a subject of ever-changing legisla-
tion.154 In United States v. Bailey, for instance, the Tennessee Circuit
Court held that a law extending the jurisdiction of U.S. courts to include
crimes committed on Native American territory was unconstitutional be-
cause it exceeded the power delegated to Congress in the Indian Com-
merce Clause.155 Several years later, Congress passed the Indian Country
Crime Act—one of the most important laws covering crimes in Indian
country prior to the Major Crimes Act—which gave federal courts juris-
diction over “crimes committed by an Indian against a non-Indian, and by
a non-Indian against an Indian,” but reserves prosecution of Native
American on Native American crime or Native American crimes pun-
ished under tribal law to the tribes.156
Compared to the definition of commerce in Lopez, the definition of
commerce under the pre-1885 Indian Commerce Clause is far broader.157
Specifically, laws such as the Indian Country Crime Act regulate activity
that does not affect the channels or instrumentalities of commerce and
does not necessarily have a substantial effect on commerce, but would
likely affect U.S.-Native American diplomatic relations.158 This suggests
that highly offensive, socially destructive behavior with arguably limited
economic impact—such as the sexual violence regulated by the Violence
Against Women Act—would count as “commerce” under the Indian
Commerce Clause because of its potential to strain U.S.-Native American
dialogue even though it is not “commerce” under the Interstate Com-
merce Clause.159
151. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, I Stat. 50.
152. Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 19, 1 Stat. 329.
153. Id.
154. STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES, 128 (4th ed. 2012).
155. United States v. Bailey, 24 F. Cas. 937, 940 (C.C.D. Tenn. 1834) (“If this [Act] be a
constitutional provision, the jurisdiction by congress for the punishment of offences in the
Indian country, within the boundaries of any state, is without limit.”).
156. Pevar, supra note 154, at 129.
157. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
158. See id.; Pevar, supra note 154, at 129.
159. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 598 (2000).
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D. LIMITATIONS ON THE EXERCISE OF THE INDIAN
COMMERCE POWER
As expansive as this definition of commerce is, pre-1885 law and case
law makes clear that Congressional power over Indian commerce is not
without limits. On the contrary, federal power is limited by tribal rights as
“distinct, independent political communities” and by the trust relation-
ship between the federal government and tribes.160
First and foremost, the Indian commerce power is limited by the sover-
eignty of Native American tribes. As the Supreme Court explained in
Worcester v. Georgia, “Indian nations [are] distinct political communities,
having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive,
and having a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not
only acknowledged, but guaranteed by the United States.”161 Accord-
ingly, tribes have an inherent right of self-government.162 Congress might
regulate internal tribal affairs via treaty, but never by law.163  Internal
tribal affairs seem generally to be those that occur on tribal territory. For
instance, historically, tribes have exercised jurisdiction over civil matters
that occur on tribal land, including matters involving non-Native Ameri-
cans.164 Those few laws that did regulate Native American conduct on
Native American territory, concerned criminal activity against non-Na-
tive Americans,165 thus suggesting that to be valid, a law that trespassed
into internal tribal affairs required a “jurisdictional nexus” with the im-
mediate welfare of non-Native Americans.166
Although it might seem that the Indian commerce power would also be
limited by the rights of individual Americans to contract and trade with
Native Americans, there is little evidence to support this assertion.167 In
fact, the federal government has historically been very willing to constrict
individual contact with Native Americans by requiring that potential
traders obtain licenses to conduct trade, precluding transfers of land with-
out federal approval, and restricting the types of goods that could be
traded.168 Certainly non-Native Americans have no intrinsic right to ex-
ploit or harm Native Americans and, on paper at least, pains have been
taken to pass laws that discourage this.169
In contrast, federal power does seem limited by a sort of general re-
sponsibility to the welfare and protection of Native American tribes. In
many instances, this responsibility appears to arise from explicit agree-
160. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 519 (1832).
161. Id. at 557.
162. Pevar, supra note 154, at 82.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 101-103.
164. Pevar, supra note 154, at 150.
165. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 155.
166. Pevar, supra note 154, at 129.
167. See United States v. Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d 784, 793 (6th Cir. 2015).
168. See Act of July 22, 1790 § 1; United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whisky, 108
U.S. 491, 493 (1883); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 568 (1823).
169. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 50.
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ments with Native Americans.170 In United States v. Forty-Three Gallons
of Whisky, for instance, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of a law that prohibited the unlicensed sale of liquor in “Indian country”
and surrounding areas.171 This prohibition was enacted subject to a treaty
with the affected Native Americans and was purportedly designed to se-
cure Indian communities against the debasing influence of “spirituous li-
quors.”172 Generally, the many treaties signed between the United States
and tribes contained assurances of protection from non-Native Ameri-
cans and “the perpetual availability of a sustained, land- based, tradi-
tional existence for the native nations.”173
In addition, at least part of this responsibility appears to arise from the
inequality in fact between tribes and the United States.174 In Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, the Supreme Court famously described this relation-
ship as “resembl[ing] that of a ward to his guardian,” such that Native
American tribes “look to [the federal] government for protection; rely
upon its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants.”175
As Stephen Pevar points out in his book, The Rights of Indians and
Tribes, notwithstanding some paternalistic overtones, the ward-guardian
analogy the Supreme Court employs suggests obligation between the
United States and tribes, not tribal inability to self-govern.176 After all, at
the time Cherokee Nation was decided, Congress did not attempt to legis-
late internal tribal matters.177 The ward theory of U.S.-Native American
relations is thought to have contributed to the trust doctrine, which con-
tinues to guide modern Native American law and policy.178
E. INDIAN COMMERCE CLAUSE LAW SUGGESTS A NEW DEFINITION
OF FOREIGN COMMERCE
Examining the Foreign Commerce Clause through the lens of pre-1885
Indian Commerce Clause law suggests a novel definition of foreign com-
merce. Given the many similarities between pre-1885 U.S.-Native Ameri-
can relations and modern U.S.-foreign relations,179 courts should
consider importing the pre-1885 definition of commerce into the Foreign
Commerce Clause context. This Article suggests that commerce under
the Foreign Commerce Clause should be defined as commercial or diplo-
matic activities between the United States and a foreign nation and—
170. Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The
Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471, 1496-97 (1994).
171. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. at 492.
172. Id.
173. Wood, supra note 170, at 1497.
174. See supra Section III.A.4: Shared Regulation of Relationships Fraught with Ine-
quality and Exploitation.
175. 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
176. Pevar, supra note 154, at 31.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 99-101.
178. See Wilkins, supra note 128, at 68.
179. See supra Section III.A: Similarities Between Indian Commerce Clause Law and
Foreign Commerce Clause Law: Sovereignty, Inequality, and the Lure of Limitless Power.
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borrowing from Bollinger—an activity that “demonstrably affects” will-
ingness or ability of foreign countries or individuals to engage in commer-
cial or diplomatic activities with the United States.180
As with the Indian Commerce Clause power,181 the Foreign Commerce
Clause power is limited by the sovereignty of foreign nations. In practice,
this suggests two levels of regulation under the Foreign Commerce
Clause. When regulating American conduct overseas, power under the
Clause is quite broad. Congress has the ability to regulate Americans en-
gaged in any type of conduct implicated under the definition described
above, including apparently local criminal activity against non-Ameri-
cans.182 On the other hand, power under the Clause to regulate non-
American conduct is quite limited and requires a strong nexus with the
United States.183 Commercial or diplomatic activity with the United
States would likely suffice. Criminal activity against an American on for-
eign soil might qualify as well.184 However, a mere civil wrong against an
American would not.185 Certainly, non-American on non-Americans
crimes and civil wrongs that occur on foreign soil could not be regulated
except via treaty.186
An obligation to protect and support less powerful nations constrains
the foreign commerce power to a lesser degree than the same obligation
constrains the Indian Commerce power.187 The “unique” relationship be-
tween the United States and Native American tribes, and the many trea-
ties promising protection and friendship between them, is unlikely to be
180. See United States v. Bollinger, 798 F.3d 201, 215-16 (4th Cir. 2015). This definition
violates the maxim that law should generally be understood to minimize redundancy. See,
e.g., Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 362 (1979) (interpreting a statute in a way that
eliminates unnecessary redundancy).  If the Foreign Commerce Clause confers power on
Congress to regulate diplomatic activity, for instance, at least part of the power conferred
by this clause is redundant with congressional power to effectuate treaties via the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.  However, there may be compel-
ling reasons to overlook the redundancies this definition creates.  First, redundancy is a
long-standing issue for the Indian Commerce Clause: as applied pre-1885 when relation-
ships with Native Americans were often formalized with treaties, the Indian Commerce
Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause partially overlap in the power they confer.
See, e.g., Treaty Between the United States of America and the Klamath and Moadoc
Tribes and Yahooskin band of Snake Indians art. IX, Oct. 14, 1864, 16 Stat. 707.  Generally,
the Commerce Clause is often read to permit such broad power that it suffers from ac-
quired redundancy. See Richard Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE L.J. 576,
641 (2014).  Eliminating redundancy from the Commerce Clause may no longer be possible
or practical.  Second, commentators have pointed out that redundancy can confer real ben-
efits, such as improving clarity and guarding against communication failure. John M.
Golden, Redundancy: When Law Repeats Itself, 94 TEX. L. REV. 629, 659-60 (2016).  In a
concise, flexible document like the Constitution, clarity may be improved by simply grant-
ing Congress the power to regulate foreign commerce without carving out an exception for
commerce that is already regulated under treaty.
181. See supra Section III.D: Limitations on the Exercise of the Indian Commerce
Power.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 52-56.
183. See supra text accompanying note 165.
184. Cf. Pevar, supra note 154, at 129.
185. Cf. Pevar, supra note 154, at 150.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 163-165.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 173-175.
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duplicated between the United States and another foreign nation.188
However, to the extent the United States has promised protection and
aid to another nation, the United States owes a duty to that nation and its
citizens. Further, as a general matter, the United States should not assist
in the American exploitation of vulnerable non-Americans. Individual
Americans do not necessarily have a right to engage in commerce with
non-Americans if doing so will discourage those non-Americans from
transacting further with the United States.189
F. EXAMPLE APPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED DEFINITION OF
FOREIGN COMMERCE
Applying this definition of commerce to the PROTECT Act and the
IPKC Act highlights the strengths of this definition. Under the definition
proposed in this Article, both the commercial and non-commercial
prongs of the PROTECT Act would be valid exercises of the Foreign
Commerce Clause power.190 The commercial prong would survive be-
cause sexual acts for any type of monetary exchange are fundamentally
commercial acts and thus can be regulated. The non-commercial prong
would survive because sexual abuse of foreign nationals by U.S. citizens
or U.S. permanent residents is conduct that would affect the willingness
of victims, their families, and their communities to interact commercially
and diplomatically with the United States.191 Sexual abuse—especially
the repeated sexual abuse that characterizes child sex tourism—damages
the image of the United States abroad.192 Moreover, in so far as there are
friendly relations between the United States and the country the crime
victim lives in, the United States also has an obligation to ensure that its
citizens do not abuse their power abroad.193
Notably, the definition this article proposes has an attenuated nexus
requirement regarding the regulation of American conduct. This elimi-
nates the need for an awkward intent requirement in the non-commercial
prong of the PROTECT Act.194 The definition proposed here bears little
resemblance to the Lopez definition because it was not crafted to allow
for state rights. Accordingly, this definition does not force proponents of
the non-commercial prong to base the provision’s validity on the fact that
188. See supra text accompanying note 85.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 165-168.
190. See Notebaert, supra note 41 and accompanying text.
191. See United States v. Bollinger, 798 F.3d 201, 205 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing victim im-
pact statements describing how victims of Bollinger and their families were humiliated and
ostracized in their community).
192. See, e.g., Kyle Cutts, A Modicum of Recovery: How Child Sex Tourism Constitutes
Slavery Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 277, 279 (2007)
(“United States citizens account for nearly twenty-five percent of all sex tourists world-
wide—the largest percentage of any country in the world.”).
193. See, e.g., U.S. Relations With Haiti Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T STATE (May 11, 2015),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1982.htm [https://perma.cc/RPE2-98DB] (describing Haiti,
where Bollinger’s victims lived, as a “U.S. policy priority” such that “[w]hen this close
neighbor is more prosperous [and] secure . . .  Haitians and Americans benefit.”).
194. See supra text accompanying note 41.
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the abuser traveled in the channels of commerce in order to commit
abuse.195 The definition embraces the breadth of the Bollinger definition,
but supports it based on a substantial body of law.196
In contrast, the IPKC Act would be constitutional as applied to cases
involving American kidnappers or American victims, but not to cases in
which a foreign national retains a foreign child who are merely passed
through the United States abroad. Analyzing the first type of event, the
kidnapping or retention of a child or by an American overseas may have
some effect on how that child and his or her family perceives the United
States. Unlike child sexual abuse, which is universally reviled, parental
kidnapping may elicit different reactions depending on the culture and
circumstances of the person witnessing the act. In United States v.
Shahani-Jahromi, for instance, the removing parent was from Iran and
argued that his actions were legal under Iranian law and, presumably,
acceptable to at least some Iranians.197 However, given the broad power
Congress enjoys under the suggested definition over American con-
duct198 and the presence of a strong nexus with the United States through
the citizenship of the perpetrator or the victim of the crime,199 it seems
likely that Congress could regulate the criminal activity of child kidnap-
ping by or against an American abroad.
On the other hand, a case in which a foreign national kidnapped or
retained a foreign national child abroad has a far less compelling jurisdic-
tional nexus. Passage through the United States in connection with com-
mission of the crime might serve as a nexus. However, mere passage of
the foreign child through the United States at some unspecified point in
the past is almost certainly insufficient to justify U.S. intrusion into for-
eign sovereignty.200 Hence, under the definition suggested in this article,
the IPKC Act should be altered to include a nexus requirement such that,
“[w]hoever removes a child from the United States, or attempts to do so,
or retains a child (who has been in the United States) outside the United
States with intent to obstruct the lawful exercise of parental rights shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both,”
provided that the abductor or the child is a U.S. citizen or Lawful Perma-
nent Resident.201
195. See United States v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v.
Flath, 845 F. Supp. 2d 951, 955-56 (E.D. Wis. 2012). In Bollinger, the Fourth Circuit cor-
rectly points out that this analysis means that Congress is free to criminalize any foreign
conduct that occurs after an American citizen travels out of the United States because
travel will always implicate the “channels” of commerce. 798 F.3d 201, 216 (4th Cir. 2015).
196. See Bollinger, 798 F.3d at 216-17.
197. 286 F. Supp. 2d 723, 726 (E.D. Va. 2003).
198. See supra text accompanying note 181.
199. See supra text accompanying note 165.
200. See supra text accompanying note 182-185.
201. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1204 (West 2016).
558 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
IV. CONCLUSION
The largely blank slate of the outward-looking Foreign Commerce
Clause can tempt courts and commentators to cling to the Interstate
Commerce Clause—a thoroughly analyzed portion of the Commerce
Clause, but dissimilar in many ways to its foreign counterpart—or to
move boldly into the breach, crafting novel interpretations with little ref-
erence to precedent. This Article urges a third approach. The Indian
Commerce Clause has produced a developed body of law that tracks U.S.
relations with diverse, independent nations. The depth of this law gives
modern analysts the benefit of hindsight: certainly, there are chapters of
U.S.-Native American relations that should not be repeated. This law
suggests that the framers understood “commerce” between the U.S. and
other sovereign nation to encompass not just trade, but commercial and
diplomatic relations with other nations as well as activity that “demon-
strably affects” willingness or ability of foreign countries or individuals to
engage in commercial or diplomatic activities with the United States. This
broad understanding was subject to profound limitations: in deference to
other nations’ sovereignty, the United States retained significant control
over its own citizens’ behavior on foreign soil, but had very limited ability
to regulate the behavior of other citizens. In some instances, the United
States also had an independent duty to make decisions consistent with the
welfare and autonomy of foreign nations.
If the Foreign Commerce Clause does become the basis for more extra-
territorial laws, it may raise larger questions about the proper scope of
the Interstate Commerce Clause and the extra-constitutional powers de-
scribed in Curtiss-Wright.202 Precisely defining the scope of the Foreign
Commerce Clause might encourage Congress to cite it as a source of
power and might ultimately contribute to the constriction of other powers
which have historically filled this void.
202. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
